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Date: April 30, 2024 Tue
Time: 2:14 am
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Results for airport security
18 results foundAuthor: U.S. Government Accountability Office Title: Aviation Security: Efforts to Validate TSA's Passenger Screening Behavior Detection Program Underway, but Opportunities Exist to Strengthen Validation and Address Operational Challenges Summary: "To enhance avaiation security, the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) began initial testing in October 2003 of its Screening of Passengers by Observation Techniques (SPOT) program. Behavior Detection Officers (BDO) carry out SPOT’s mission to identify persons who pose a risk to aviation security by focusing on behavioral and appearance indicators. GAO was asked to review the SPOT program. GAO analyzed (1) the extent to which TSA validated the SPOT program before deployment, (2) implementation challenges, and (3) the extent to which TSA measures SPOT’s effect on aviation security. GAO analyzed TSA documents, such as strategic plans and operating procedures; interviewed agency personnel and subject matter experts; and visited 15 SPOT airports, among other things. Although the results from these visits are not generalizable, they provided insights into SPOT operations. GAO recommends that TSA, among other things, use an independent panel of experts to assist in validating SPOT, enhance SPOT data collection and analysis, fully utilize TSA resources to identify possible threats, and establish a plan to develop more outcome-oriented measures for SPOT. DHS reviewed a draft of this report and generally concurred with our recommendations although its plans do not fully address one of our recommendations." Details: Washington, DC: GAO, 2010. 89p. Source: Internet Resource; GAO-10-763; Accessed August 16, 2010 at: http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d10763.pdf Year: 2010 Country: United States URL: http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d10763.pdf Shelf Number: 119615 Keywords: Airport SecurityPassenger ScreeningTransportation Security |
Author: Lord, Stephen M. Title: Aviation Security: TSA Is Taking Steps to Validate the Science Underlying Its Passenger Behavior Detection Program, but Efforts May Not Be Comprehensive Summary: The attempted passenger aircraft bombing of Northwest flight 253 on December 25, 2009, provided a vivid reminder that the civil aviation system remains an attractive terrorist target. To enhance aviation security, in October 2003 the Department of Homeland Security’s (DHS) Transportation Security Administration (TSA) began testing of its Screening of Passengers by Observation Techniques (SPOT) program to identify persons who may pose a risk to aviation security. The SPOT program utilizes behavior observation and analysis techniques to identify potentially high-risk passengers. This testimony provides information on (1) the extent to which TSA has validated the scientific basis for SPOT and (2) other operational challenges. This statement is based on a prior report GAO issued in May 2010 on SPOT, including selected updates made in March 2011. For the updates, GAO reviewed documentation on TSA’s progress in implementing the report’s recommendations. Details: Washington, DC: U.S. Government Accountability Office, 2011. 13p. Source: Internet Resource: GAO-11-461T: Accessed April 18, 2011 at: http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d11461t.pdf Year: 2011 Country: United States URL: http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d11461t.pdf Shelf Number: 121378 Keywords: Airport SecurityPassenger ScreeningTransporation Security |
Author: Bozbeyoglu, Alanur Cavlin Title: The Private Sector, National Security and Personal Data: An Exploratory Assessment of Private Sector Involvement in Airport and Border Security in Canada Summary: Security has become a rationale for new laws and initiatives that call in question the future of key Canadian social values and legal rights, including the right to privacy. Security tasks are increasingly carried out by the private sector. This exploratory study by the Surveillance Studies Centre (SSC) at Queen's University assesses the involvement of the private sector in border and airport security in Canada. Details: Kingston, ON: Surveillance Studies Centre, Queen's University, 2011. 63p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed September 6, 2011 at: http://www.sscqueens.org/sites/default/files/OPC_Final_31_March.pdf Year: 2011 Country: Canada URL: http://www.sscqueens.org/sites/default/files/OPC_Final_31_March.pdf Shelf Number: 122668 Keywords: Airport SecurityBorder Security (Canada)Private Security |
Author: Lord, Stephen M. Title: Aviation Security: TSA Has Made Progress, but Additional Efforts Are Needed to Improve Security Summary: The attempted bombing of Northwest flight 253 in December 2009 underscores the need for effective aviation security programs. Aviation security remains a daunting challenge with hundreds of airports and thousands of flights daily carrying millions of passengers and pieces of checked baggage. The Department of Homeland Security's (DHS) Transportation Security Administration (TSA) has spent billions of dollars and implemented a wide range of aviation security initiatives. Two key layers of aviation security are (1) TSA's Screening of Passengers by Observation Techniques (SPOT) program designed to identify persons who may pose a security risk; and (2) airport perimeter and access controls security. This testimony provides information on the extent to which TSA has taken actions to validate the scientific basis of SPOT and strengthen airport perimeter security. This statement is based on prior products GAO issued from September 2009 through September 2011 and selected updates in August and September 2011. To conduct the updates, GAO analyzed documents on TSA's progress in strengthening aviation security, among other things. DHS completed an initial study in April 2011 to validate the scientific basis of the SPOT program; however, additional work remains to fully validate the program. In May 2010, GAO reported that TSA deployed this program, which uses behavior observation and analysis techniques to identify potentially high-risk passengers, before determining whether there was a scientifically valid basis for using behavior and appearance indicators as a means for reliably identifying passengers who may pose a risk to the U.S. aviation system. TSA officials said that SPOT was deployed in response to potential threats, such as suicide bombers, and was based on scientific research available at the time. TSA is pilot testing revised program procedures at Boston-Logan airport in which behavior detection officers will engage passengers entering screening in casual conversation to help determine suspicious behaviors. TSA plans to expand this pilot program in the fall of 2011. GAO recommended in May 2010 that DHS, as part of its validation study, assess the methodology to help ensure the validity of the SPOT program. DHS concurred and stated that the study included an independent review with a broad range of agencies and experts. The study found that SPOT was more effective than random screening to varying degrees. However, DHS's study was not designed to fully validate whether behavior detection can be used to reliably identify individuals in an airport environment who pose a security risk. The study also noted that additional work was needed to comprehensively validate the program. TSA officials are assessing the actions needed to address the study's recommendations but do not have time frames for completing this work. In September 2009 GAO reported that since 2004 TSA has taken actions to strengthen airport perimeter and access controls security by, among other things, deploying a random worker screening program; however, TSA had not conducted a comprehensive risk assessment or developed a national strategy. Specifically, TSA had not conducted vulnerability assessments for 87 percent of the approximately 450 U.S. airports regulated for security by TSA in 2009. GAO recommended that TSA develop (1) a comprehensive risk assessment and evaluate the need to conduct airport vulnerability assessments nationwide and (2) a national strategy to guide efforts to strengthen airport security. DHS concurred and TSA stated that the Transportation Sector Security Risk Assessment, issued in July 2010, was to provide a comprehensive risk assessment of airport security. However, this assessment did not consider the potential vulnerabilities of airports to an insider attack--an attack from an airport worker with authorized access to secure areas. In August 2011, TSA reported that transportation security inspectors conduct vulnerability assessments annually at all commercial airports, including an evaluation of perimeter security. GAO has not yet assessed the extent to which inspectors consistently conduct vulnerability assessments. TSA also updated the Transportation Systems-Sector Specific Plan, which summarizes airport security program activities. However, the extent to which these activities were guided by measurable goals and priorities, among other things, was not clear. Providing such additional information would better address GAO's recommendation. GAO has made recommendations in prior work to strengthen TSA's SPOT program and airport perimeter and access control security efforts. DHS and TSA generally concurred with the recommendations and have actions under way to address them. Details: Washington, DC: U.S. Government Accountability Office, 2011. 19p. Source: Internet Resource: GAO-11-938T: Accessed September 19, 2011 at: http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d11938t.pdf Year: 2011 Country: United States URL: http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d11938t.pdf Shelf Number: 122775 Keywords: Airport SecurityPassenger ScreeningTransportation Security |
Author: Title: TSA's Oversight of the Airport Badging Process Needs Improvement Summary: The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) is responsible for protecting the Nation’s transportation systems. This includes ensuring that employees working in secured airport areas are properly vetted and badged. The agency relies on designated airport operator employees to perform the badging application process. Our objective was to determine whether the TSA provides effective oversight for the issuance of airport security badges. Individuals who pose a threat may obtain airport badges and gain access to secured airport areas. We analyzed vetting data from 359 airport badging offices and identified badge holder records with omissions or inaccuracies pertaining to security threat assessment status, birthdates, and birthplaces. For example, of the badges were issued to individuals without a complete security threat assessment. These problems exist because TSA has designed and implemented only limited oversight of the application process. Specifically, the agency did not: Ensure that airport operators have quality assurance procedures for the badging application process; Ensure that airport operators provide training and tools to designated badge office employees; and Require its Transportation Security Inspectors to verify the airport data during their reviews. Consequently, the safety of airport workers, passengers, and aircraft is at risk due to the potential of inappropriate individuals obtaining airport badges. TSA concurred with five recommendations and partially concurred with one that will improve the effectiveness of safeguards over the badging process. Details: Washington, DC: Department of Homeland Security, 2011. 34p. Source: Report OIG-11-95: Internet Resource: Accessed February 10, 2012 at http://chsdemocrats.house.gov/SiteDocuments/20110803172118-83003.pdf Year: 2011 Country: United States URL: http://chsdemocrats.house.gov/SiteDocuments/20110803172118-83003.pdf Shelf Number: 124040 Keywords: Airport SecurityEmployee FraudTransportation SecurityWorkplace Crime |
Author: Ponemon, Larry Title: Airport Insecurity: The Case of Lost & Missing Laptops - Executive Summary U.S. & EMEA Results Summary: Do you ever worry about losing your laptop computer while rushing to catch a flight at a busy airport? Everyday business travelers are putting the sensitive and confidential data of their organizations at risk when they travel through airports. Sponsored by Dell, Ponemon Institute conducted this study, Airport Insecurity: The Case of Lost & Missing Laptops to understand the current risks posed to sensitive and confidential data contained in the laptops of business travelers. Companies are dependent upon a mobile workforce with access to information no matter where they travel. However, this mobility is putting companies at risk of having a data breach if a laptop containing sensitive information is lost, missing or stolen. The findings of this study are important in helping companies understand what they should be doing to protect the information on their employees’ laptops and to reduce the likelihood that their employees will lose laptops while traveling. The twofold objectives of this study are: To understand how major airports throughout the United States and six EMEA nations handle laptops that are lost, stolen or missing within their facilities. Our study determines the frequency, prevalence, and airport operating practices concerning lost or missing laptops at security checkpoints, departure gates, airport retail areas, lounges and so forth. To assess business travelers’ awareness and concern about data loss. For instance, what would they do if they lost their laptop or other portable data-bearing devices? What steps would they take after learning about this loss or theft? What have they done to protect or backup the information they carry? Details: Traverse City, MI: Ponemon Institute, 2008. 19p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed March 11, 2012 at http://www.ponemon.org/local/upload/fckjail/generalcontent/18/file/LostLaptopsDell%20EMEA%20Final%208.pdf Year: 2008 Country: United States URL: http://www.ponemon.org/local/upload/fckjail/generalcontent/18/file/LostLaptopsDell%20EMEA%20Final%208.pdf Shelf Number: 124455 Keywords: Airport SecurityLaptop TheftTheftTheft of Computers |
Author: Chau, Foo-cheong, Sidney Title: Application of the Principles of Corporate Governance to Enhance Efficiency of Airport Security Services Summary: Today, aviation security is at the forefront of public consciousness particularly when they think of their own personal safety. The dramatic and catastrophic attacks of 911, utilizing civil aviation resources has made the world view aviation security with a critical eye. It could be argued that the response by States and individual airports and airlines has been positive and rapid, however the effectiveness has been marginal. Many factors have been proffered as the reason, from ineffective conservative governments, out-dated equipment, old infrastructure to a traditional mind-set that does not always accept change. Due to the limited scope of this research paper, the author has chosen to concentrate on Corporate Governance and three associated principles, “ethics”, “accountability” and “oversight” to assess the effectiveness of aviation security. This theme was chosen because, in the 1990s the Hong Kong Government considered Corporate Governance was a key ingredients needed for a positive paradigm shift in the way aviation security was implemented at the Hong Kong International Airport (HKIA). Government and the public felt, that the management of the old “Kai Tak” airport in Kowloon prior to 1998 did not adequately consider Corporate Governance as a key ingredient to successful security resulting in long-standing misgivings about the airport’s ability to meet security requirements. Fortuitously for this research paper, HKIA was relocated from Kowloon to Lantau Island in 1998 and a new Government owned company Aviation Security Company Limited (AVSECO) was set up at that time to provide the security. The Government and the Board of Directors of AVSECO were able to learn from the weaknesses of the old airport and from the outset understood the need for a change in the way the security was provided at the airport. So spurred on by the imminent airport relocation and the establishment of a AVSECO at the new airport, the Government considered it was an ideal time to change the security philosophy and make the new company accountable through good corporate governance. With this background, the aim of this research paper is to review the standards and recommended practices set by the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO), which is a Specialized agency of the UN having the aim of safeguarding civil aviation against actual and threats of ‘unlawful interference to civil aviation’. To do this, there is a literature review and observations from within the aviation industry. This review found that the security measures implemented to enforce the standards and therefore counter the real and emerging threats has been poor throughout the world. The question the industry therefore needs to ask is “If all the experts of the world have joined together (through ICAO) to set the standards to mitigate the risk, why does the public still feel the measures are unrealistic or ineffective in most airports?” Also, “Why, when we know in theory what to do, is it that many airports still fail to stop the threats? “In order to solve this puzzle, the paper critically looks at the international standards and their global implementation. Then, utilizing HKIA as a case study, the paper discusses if good corporate governance is a key to the successful implementation of effective aviation security. The literature review and analysis of security data collected over the past 6 years at HKIA suggests that good Corporate Governance is in fact a key ingredient for effective security at airports. The limitations of this paper, only allows for the study of three principles of good corporate governance, namely ‘Oversight’, ‘Ethics’ and ‘Accountability’. It goes without saying that there are many other factors that can influence the success or otherwise of the implementation of effective aviation security – for example organizational culture, equipment employed, staff training, quality control, policies and procedures, to name just a few. The paper only discusses these other variables when they directly relate to the three chosen corporate governance principles at HKIA. To sum up, despite the effective promulgation of international standards, the related effectiveness of the implementation has varied greatly from airport to airport. Many variables, either independently or collectively can be the cause of failure. This paper concentrated only on how the introduction of corporate governance (particularly the three key principles) improved the way HKIA conducted business in relation to Aviation Security forever. The change to good corporate governance did not occur over night and has taken almost 15 years for effective management oversight, company ethics and accountability to become enshrined into the company philosophy. The data reviewed from HKIA, however, does suggest that the transformation has been dramatic and effective, showing that, when emphasized and enshrined into corporate culture, good Corporate Governance will increase the likelihood of success in the on-going fight against unlawful interference against civil aviation. Details: Hong Kong: University of Hong Kong Department of Politics and Public Administration, 2012. 55p. Source: Internet Resource: Master's Essay; Accessed July 22, 2013 at: http://hub.hku.hk/bitstream/10722/184356/1/FullText.pdf?accept=1 Year: 2012 Country: Asia URL: http://hub.hku.hk/bitstream/10722/184356/1/FullText.pdf?accept=1 Shelf Number: 129479 Keywords: Airport SecurityAviation Security (Asia) |
Author: U.S. Government Accountability Office Title: Transportation Security: Action Needed to Strengthen TSA's Security Threat Assessment Process Summary: The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) implements programs that, for example, ensure individuals with unescorted access to secure areas of the nation’s critical transportation infrastructure do not pose a security threat. Key to these programs are security threat assessments that screen individuals for links to terrorism, criminal history, and immigration status. TSA’s Adjudication Center serves as the primary operational component in this process. GAO was asked to examine the performance and staffing strategy of the center. This report addresses the extent to which 1) TSA has measured performance for the center and what the data show; 2) TSA offices have coordinated to meet security threat assessment workload; and 3) TSA addressed potential risks posed by using a mix of government employees and contractors to adjudicate security threat assessments. GAO analyzed TSA data describing the center’s performance since October 2010; reviewed documentation, including staffing plans; and interviewed TSA officials about data measurement and staffing practices. What GAO Recommends GAO recommends that TSA, among other things: direct the Adjudication Center to calculate an accuracy rate that includes adjudicator performance for cases where applicants were both approved and disqualified; share adjudicator staffing plans among key program offices; and update its Adjudication Center workforce conversion plan and provide it to DHS for review and approval. DHS concurred with our recommendations. Details: Washington, DC: GAO, 2013. 48p. Source: Internet Resource: GAO-13-629: Accessed August 8, 2013 at: http://www.gao.gov/assets/660/656051.pdf Year: 2013 Country: United States URL: http://www.gao.gov/assets/660/656051.pdf Shelf Number: 129590 Keywords: Airport SecurityCargo SecurityMaritime SecurityThreat AssessmentsTransportation Security (U.S.) |
Author: Australian National Audit Office Title: Policing at Australian International Airports Summary: The objective of the audit was to assess the Australian Federal Police's (AFP's) management of policing services at Australian international airports. In order to form a conclusion against this audit objective, the Australian National Audit Office (ANAO) examined if: - the transition to the 'All In' model of policing at airports (Project Macer) had been delivered effectively; - appropriate processes are in place for managing risk and operational planning; - effective stakeholder engagement, relationship management and information sharing arrangements are in place; - facilities at the airports are adequate and appropriate; and - appropriate mechanisms for measuring the effectiveness of policing at airports have been developed and implemented. Details: Barton, ACT: National Audit Office, 2014. 124p. Source: Internet Resource: Audit Report No. 23 2013-14: Accessed April 28, 2014 at: http://www.anao.gov.au/~/media/Files/Audit%20Reports/2013%202014/Audit%20Report%2023/AuditReport_2013-2014_23.pdf Year: 2014 Country: Australia URL: http://www.anao.gov.au/~/media/Files/Audit%20Reports/2013%202014/Audit%20Report%2023/AuditReport_2013-2014_23.pdf Shelf Number: 132192 Keywords: Airport SecurityTransit Security |
Author: Baur-Ahrens, Andreas Title: How Smart Is "Smart Security"? Exploring Data Subjectivity and Resistance Summary: 'Smart security' is currently being used as an umbrella term that embraces several initiatives proposed by the aviation industry in order to enhance security procedures at airports. The idea of smarter security opposes the traditional screening framework of passenger security at airports which enacts a one-size-fits-all approach in order to detect dangerous items that might threaten flight safety and security. Recently however, the security industry claims that smart solutions could provide better security, less intrusive screening, and better cost efficiency by employing tailored security procedures based on individual data-driven risk assessment of passengers and corresponding different levels of security screening. As smart security solutions are currently still under development, this report analyses potential human rights problems connected to a broader implementation of smart security routines in a timely fashion. Constituent elements of smart security, such as computer-based sorting of individuals into risk-groups and algorithms preparing or taking decisions on passengers' mobility, can have severe consequences. Critical questions to be asked include: Who is accountable for smart security decisions? Is it possible to appeal against such decisions? How dangerous is the data-driven approach with regard to structural discrimination and equality of all passengers? We review and summarise the state of the art in the field of data-driven risk analysis and analyse eight interviews that we have conducted with representatives of European aviation associations, state authorities and the civil society. Bearing in mind the human rights implications of smart security, the report identifies six central policy gaps, issues recommendations to address them and provides a basis for a much needed public debate on smart security. Details: Tubingen: University of Tubingen, Internationales Zentrum fur Ethik in den Wissenschaften, 2015. 49p Source: Internet Resource: Accessed February 2, 2016 at: https://publikationen.uni-tuebingen.de/xmlui/bitstream/handle/10900/66898/How%20Smart%20Is%20Smart%20Security_IZEW_201511.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y Year: 2015 Country: International URL: https://publikationen.uni-tuebingen.de/xmlui/bitstream/handle/10900/66898/How%20Smart%20Is%20Smart%20Security_IZEW_201511.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y Shelf Number: 137744 Keywords: Airport SecurityAviation IndustrySecuritySurveillance |
Author: Task Force on Combating Terrorist and Foreign Fighter Travel Title: Final Report of the Task Force on Combating Terrorism and Foreign Fighter Travel Summary: Today we are witnessing the largest global convergence of jihadists in history, as individuals from more than 100 countries have migrated to the conflict zone in Syria and Iraq since 2011. Some initially flew to the region to join opposition groups seeking to oust Syrian dictator Bashar al-Assad, but most are now joining the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS), inspired to become a part of the group's "caliphate" and to expand its repressive society. Over 25,000 foreign fighters have traveled to the battlefield to enlist with Islamist terrorist groups, including at least 4,500 Westerners. More than 250 individuals from the United States have also joined or attempted to fight with extremists in the conflict zone. These fighters pose a serious threat to the United States and its allies. Armed with combat experience and extremist connections, many of them are only a plane-flight away from our shores. Even if they do not return home to plot attacks, foreign fighters have taken the lead in recruiting a new generation of terrorists and are seeking to radicalize Westerners online to spread terror back home. Responding to the growing threat, the House Homeland Security Committee established the Task Force on Combating Terrorist and Foreign Fighter Travel in March 2015. Chairman Michael McCaul and Ranking Member Bennie Thompson appointed a bipartisan group of eight lawmakers charged with reviewing the threat to the United States from foreign fighters, examining the government's preparedness to respond to a surge in terrorist travel, and providing a final report with findings and recommendations to address the challenge. Members and staff also assessed security measures in other countries, as U.S. defenses depend partly on whether foreign governments are able to interdict extremists before they reach our shores. Details: Washington, DC: The Task Force, 2016. 66p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed February 3, 2016 at: https://homeland.house.gov/wp-content/uploads/2015/09/TaskForceFinalReport.pdf Year: 2015 Country: United States URL: https://homeland.house.gov/wp-content/uploads/2015/09/TaskForceFinalReport.pdf Shelf Number: 137746 Keywords: Airport SecurityBorder SecurityExtremistsHomeland SecurityRadicalsTerrorismTerroristsViolent Extremism |
Author: U.S. Government Accountability Office Title: Aviation Security: Airport Perimeter and Access Control Security Would Benefit from Risk Assessment and Strategy Updates Summary: Why GAO Did This Study Incidents of aviation workers using access privileges to smuggle weapons and drugs into security-restricted areas and onto planes has heightened awareness about security at commercial airports. TSA, along with airport operators, has responsibility for securing the nation's approximately 440 commercial airports. GAO was asked to review TSA's oversight of airport perimeter and access control security since GAO last reported on the topic in 2009. This report examines, for airport security, (1) the extent to which TSA has assessed the components of risk and (2) the extent to which TSA has taken actions to oversee and facilitate security, among other objectives. GAO examined TSA documents related to risk assessment and security activities; analyzed relevant TSA security event data from fiscal years 2009 through 2015; obtained information from TSA and industry association officials as well as from a non-generalizable sample of 11 airports, selected based on factors such as size. What GAO Recommends GAO is making six recommendations, including that TSA update its Risk Assessment of Airport Security, develop and implement a method for conducting a system-wide assessment of airport vulnerability, and update its National Strategy for Airport Perimeter and Access Control Security. DHS concurred with the recommendations and identified planned actions to address the recommendations. Details: Washington, DC: GAO, 2016. 85p. Source: Internet Resource: GAO-16-632: Accessed May 31, 2016 at: http://www.gao.gov/assets/680/677586.pdf Year: 2016 Country: United States URL: http://www.gao.gov/assets/680/677586.pdf Shelf Number: 139249 Keywords: Airport SecurityAviation SecurityDrug TraffickingRisk AssessmentSmugglingTransportation Security |
Author: Arsenault, Jean-Francois Title: A Discussion of the Economics of Preclearance with Proposed Measurement Methodologies Summary: This report has three objectives: summarize the international literature on the economic and social impact of preclearance operations; identify additional benefits of preclearance not well covered in the literature; and propose feasible methodologies to quantitatively measure the benefits to Canada of establishing preclearance processes and facilities in different environments. Preclearance benefits have not generally been the subject of much measurement. Based on an analysis and literature review, benefits were classified in five categories: optimizing border resources; improving security; improving the experience of crossing the border for passengers; improving the experience of crossing the border for carriers; and generating 'spin-off' benefits. In general, benefits in the first four categories are additive, while the last category spans a wide range of beneficial impacts of preclearance which generally can only be assessed using input-output or computable general equilibrium models. The report describes each benefit, identifies the main recipient of the benefit, and proposes specific methodologies to measure these benefits. For some benefits, in particular those related to security, the inherent difficulties in measuring the impact of preclearance leads the authors to suggest a qualitative treatment. Some preliminary estimates, based on heavy assumptions, are provided as a first step towards an accurate measurement of benefits. Executive Summary Preclearance refers to a process in which customs, immigration and other border functions of a foreign country (e.g. United States) are undertaken within a host country (e.g. Canada). Such operations can potentially generate significant benefits for governments, users and carriers. Preclearance benefits, however, have not generally been the subject of much measurement. This report has three objectives: summarize the international literature on the economic and social impact of preclearance operations; identify additional benefits of preclearance not well covered in the literature; and propose feasible methodologies to quantitatively measure the benefits to Canada of establishing preclearance processes and facilities in various contexts. Details: Ottawa: Public Safety Canada, 2015. 78p. Source: Internet Resource: Research Report:2015-R032: Accessed July 26, 2016 at: http://www.publicsafety.gc.ca/cnt/rsrcs/pblctns/2015-r032/index-en.aspx Year: 2015 Country: Canada URL: http://www.publicsafety.gc.ca/cnt/rsrcs/pblctns/2015-r032/index-en.aspx Shelf Number: 139860 Keywords: Airport SecurityBorder SecurityHomeland SecuritySecurity |
Author: Kuperman, Mark I. Title: Re-Thinking Maritime Risk: Linking Piracy, Global Shipping and Ports - and - what Cruise/Ferry Terminals Can Learn from Airports Summary: This thesis addresses two issues related to maritime risk. The first concerns recognizing high-volume shipping destined for U.S. ports initially journeys through foreign waters and ports where crime, piracy and terrorism are hazards. The second issue is prioritizing maritime risk mitigation in response to multi-variable threats and vulnerabilities. This subject is compounded by limited resources and a reliance on collaborative partnerships. The thesis mainly focuses on the relationship between piracy and U.S. maritime interests since piracy has a nexus offshore and in waterways where U.S.-bound ships originate or transit. The approach is three-fold. First, the initial two chapters identify piracy as a threat which shipping encounters in global hot-spots before entering U.S. waters. Chapter 1 associates connections between piracy and terrorism, mariners' safety in regions/waterways, and challenges of eradicating piracy, with a focused study on the Straits of Malacca. Chapter 2 identifies when offshore piracy may threaten the U.S., emphasizing the Gulf of Guinea. Chapter 3 transitions back to U.S. solutions in protecting ferry and cruise passengers within confined terminal spaces. The thesis results indicate risk-related findings. Chapter 1 highlights collaborative challenges foreign nations need to overcome while trying to protect citizens and eradicate crime/piracy. Also in Chapter 1, the findings reveal piracy and terrorism in the Straits of Malacca do not appear related. Chapter 2 categorizes the types of offshore piracy that pose risk to the U.S. Chapter 3 undertakes a multi-variable analysis of inter-modal risk mitigations and suggests certain airport models may work in ferry and cruise terminals. Details: Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University, 2014. 125p. Source: Internet Resource: Thesis: Accessed July 29, 2016 at: https://jscholarship.library.jhu.edu/handle/1774.2/37227 Year: 2014 Country: International URL: https://jscholarship.library.jhu.edu/handle/1774.2/37227 Shelf Number: 139889 Keywords: Airport Security Maritime Crime Maritime Security Piracy Risk MitigationVessel Security |
Author: Bjelopera, Jerome P. Title: The Terrorist Screening Database and Preventing Terrorist Travel Summary: After the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, the federal government developed a unified regimen to identify and list known or suspected terrorists. The regimen has received repeated congressional attention, and this report briefly discusses for congressional policymakers how the U.S. government fashions and uses the Terrorist Screening Database (TSDB) to achieve such an end. It also discusses how the federal government engages in two travel-related screening processes—visa screening and air passenger screening. Both processes involve subsets of the Terrorist Screening Database. The Terrorist Screening Database (TSDB) The TSDB lies at the heart of federal efforts to identify and share information among U.S. law enforcement about identified people who may pose terrorism-related threats to the United States. It is managed by the Terrorist Screening Center (TSC), a multi-agency organization created by presidential directive in 2003 and administered by the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI). The TSDB includes biographic identifiers for those known either to have or be suspected of having ties to terrorism. In some instances it also includes biometric information on such people. It stores hundreds of thousands of unique identities. Portions of the TSDB are exported to data systems in federal agencies that perform screening activities such as background checks, reviewing the records of passport and visa applicants, official encounters with travelers at U.S. border crossings, and air passenger screening. Foreign Nationals Traveling to the United States Two broad classes of foreign nationals are issued visas under the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA): immigrants and non-immigrants. Many visitors, however, enter the United States without visas through the Visa Waiver Program (VWP). Under the VWP, foreign nationals from 38 countries with agreements with the United States—including most countries in the European Union—do not need visas to enter the United States for short-term business or tourism and are instead vetted using biographic information to authenticate and screen individuals. Screening Aliens Department of State (DOS) consular officers check the background of all visa applicants in “lookout” databases that draw on TSDB information and other counterterrorism information such as the material housed in the National Counterterrorism Center’s Terrorist Identities Datamart Environment. DOS specifically uses the Consular Lookout and Support System (CLASS) database, which surpassed 42.5 million records in 2012. Aliens entering through the VWP have been vetted through the Electronic System for Travel Authorization (ESTA), which checks them against the TSDB. In addition, before an international flight bound for the United States departs from a foreign airport, Customs and Border Protection (CBP) officers screen the passenger manifest. CBP inspectors also perform background checks and admissibility reviews at the ports of entry that draw on information from the TSDB. Screening at the Transportation Security Administration The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) has initiated a number of risk-based screening initiatives to focus its resources and apply directed measures based on intelligence-driven assessments of security risk. A cornerstone of TSA’s risk-based initiatives is the PreCheck program. PreCheck is TSA’s latest version of a trusted traveler program that has been modeled after CBP programs. Under the PreCheck regimen, participants are vetted through a background check process (including screening against terrorist watchlist information). At selected airports, they are processed through expedited screening lanes, where they can keep shoes on and keep liquids and laptops inside carry-on bags. All passengers flying to or from U.S. airports are vetted using the TSA’s Secure Flight program. Secure Flight involves information from the TSDB housed in the No Fly List, Selectee List, and Expanded Selectee List to vet passenger name records. The No Fly List includes identities of individuals who may present a threat to civil aviation and national security. Listed individuals are not allowed to board a commercial aircraft flying into, out of, over, or within U.S. airspace; this also includes point-to-point international flights operated by U.S. carriers. The Selectee List includes individuals who must undergo additional security screening before being allowed to board a commercial aircraft. The Expanded Selectee List was created as an extra security measure in response to a failed attempt to trigger an explosive by a foreign terrorist onboard a U.S.-bound flight on December 25, 2009. It screens against all TSDB records that include a person’s first and last name and date of birth that are not already on the No Fly or Selectee lists. Details: Washington, DC: Congressional Research Services, 2016. 25p. Source: Internet Resource: CRS Report R44678: Accessed November 8, 2016 at: http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/terror/R44678.pdf Year: 2016 Country: International URL: http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/terror/R44678.pdf Shelf Number: 146283 Keywords: Airport SecurityBorder SecurityHomeland SecurityTerroristTerrorists |
Author: Hurrell, Karen Title: Experimental Analysis of Examinations and Detentions under Schedule 7 of the Terrorism Act 2000 Summary: This briefing presents an experimental analysis of data relating to Schedule 7 of the Terrorism Act 2000. This legislation provides powers in relation to port and border controls and permits passengers entering or leaving Great Britain or Northern Ireland to be stopped, questioned and detained in order to determine their possible involvement in terrorism. Schedule 7 powers can only be lawfully used to determine if the particular individual being examined is 'concerned in the commission, preparation or instigation of acts of terrorism'. The Code of Practice for Schedule 7 does not allow for ethnicity to be used as the sole reason for stopping someone. However, people can be stopped, detained and subject to potentially highly intrusive questions about their political and religious beliefs and activities, as well as those of others in their community and family, without any prior suspicion. The relatively high numbers of those stopped from certain ethnic backgrounds raises concerns that, without a requirement for reasonable suspicion, there are insufficient limitations in place to prevent a reliance on an individuals' ethnicity or country of origin as a reason for conducting the stop. The data in this briefing provide information on the number of examinations carried out in Great Britain under Schedule 7 in each of the years 2010/11 to 2012/13 broken down by ethnic group, plus additional data on the use of Schedule 7 in airports in 2010/11. An experimental analysis of race disproportionality is then based on data on Schedule 7 examinations combined with ethnic group data from two sources: international air passengers from the Civil Aviation Authority's (CAA) Passenger Survey and residents of England and Wales from the 2011 Census. This is experimental due to uncertainty over the ethnic profile of passengers passing through ports. Both these sources have both strengths and weaknesses. While the CAA Passenger Survey provides ethnicity data on air passengers, it does not cover other ports and so is less appropriate for comparison with the all ports data. It also has a high proportion of missing data for the ethnic group question. Similarly, although Census data on the resident population have higher precision, they cannot take account of the different frequency with which people travel abroad and do not include visitors. The following key results quote figures for disproportionality from the analysis using Census data, since these estimates are always lower than those based on the CAA survey data. This is because the ratio of the number of white people to the number of people in each ethnic minority group was lower for the Census, which makes the race disproportionality ratio lower too. For the purpose of this analysis, four main ethnic group categories form the basis of comparisons throughout: White, Black (Black or Black British), Mixed race and Asian or other. The last of those combining Asian or Asian British with Chinese or other. Where possible further breakdowns are presented, for example ten categories are used for the final analysis of race disproportionality in Schedule 7 usage at airports. Details: Manchester, UK: Equality and Human Rights Commission, 2014. 34p. Source: Internet Resource: Briefing paper 8: Accessed August 28, 2017 at: https://www.equalityhumanrights.com/sites/default/files/briefing-paper-8-an-experimental-analysis-of-examinations-and-detentions-under-s7-of-the-terrorism-act-2000.pdf Year: 2014 Country: United Kingdom URL: https://www.equalityhumanrights.com/sites/default/files/briefing-paper-8-an-experimental-analysis-of-examinations-and-detentions-under-s7-of-the-terrorism-act-2000.pdf Shelf Number: 146912 Keywords: Airport SecurityBorder Security Homeland Security Racial Disparities Terrorism Terrorists |
Author: Steinberg, Jonny Title: Drug smuggling and border control at Johannesburg International Airport and Durban Harbour Summary: The purpose of this paper is to describe the state of border control at Johannesburg International Airport (JIA) and Durban Harbour in regard to the detection of drugs smuggling. Before beginning the main business of the paper, though, a word on context is necessary. What is the state of the southern African drug market? What is coming in, going out, and being transhipped? Which drugs enter and leave by air, by sea and by land, and which by all three? What sort of quantities are we talking about? All of these questions are notoriously difficult to answer. The size of illicit drug markets is measured by the rate and quantity of seizures, by changes in the rate of drug arrests, changes in retail prices, by the anecdotal intelligence of investigators, street cops and prosecutors, and by the self-reporting of consumers. The last of these, selfreporting, is the most accurate, but only when data is collected through rigorous and systematic sampling. No drug consumption researcher has ever sampled for the total South African population. The short answer, then, is that we do not know nearly enough about the South African drugs market. Details: Pretoria: Institute for Security Studies, 2005. 16p. Source: Internet Resource: ISS Paper 104: Accessed April 4, 2018 at: https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/99201/104.pdf Year: 2005 Country: South Africa URL: https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/99201/104.pdf Shelf Number: 149675 Keywords: Airport SecurityDrug Markets Drug Smuggling Drug Trafficking Port Security |
Author: American Civil Liberties Union Title: Bad Trip: Debunking the TSA's 'Behavior Detection' Program Summary: Documents obtained by the ACLU through a Freedom of Information Act lawsuit concerning the TSA's behavior detection program reinforce that the program utilizes unscientific techniques and creates an unacceptable risk of racial and religious profiling. Independent experts and government auditors have long criticized the behavior detection program as flawed and wasteful-the program cost at least $1.5 billion through 2015. The TSA's own documents and materials in its files now vindicate those criticisms. The documents show the evolution of the behavior detection program and make clear the extent to which it is a program of surveillance of unsuspecting travelers based on unreliable indicators. "Behavior detection officers," some of them dressed in plain clothes, scrutinize travelers at airports for over 90 behaviors that the TSA associates with stress, fear, or deception, looking for what the TSA calls signs of "mal-intent." The reliability of these so-called indicators is not supported by the scientific studies in the TSA files. The behavior detection officers may then engage travelers in "casual conversation" that is actually an effort to probe the basis for any purported signs of deception. When the officers think they perceive those behaviors, they follow the travelers, subject them to additional screening, and at times bring in law enforcement officers who can investigate them further. The TSA has repeatedly claimed that the behavior detection program is grounded in valid science, but the records that the ACLU obtained show that the TSA has in its possession a significant body of research that contradicts those claims. The records include numerous academic studies and articles that directly undermine the premise of the program: the notion that TSA officers can identify threats to aviation security with some reliability based on specific behaviors in an airport setting. In fact, the scientific literature in the TSA's own files reinforces that deception detection is inherently unreliable, and that many of the behaviors the TSA is apparently relying on are actually useless in detecting deception. The documents further show that the TSA either overstated the scientific validity of behavior detection techniques in communications with members of Congress and government auditors, or did not disclose information that discredited the program's scientific validity. The documents also include materials that range from culturally insensitive to racially and religiously biased and sexist. We do not know whether and to what extent the TSA relied on some of these materials in implementing its behavior detection program, but the materials do not provide credible support for its validity. Finally, previously undisclosed internal investigative materials shed more light on, and substantiate already public allegations of, racial and religious profiling by behavior detection officers at specific airports-Newark, Miami, Chicago, and Honolulu. The TSA should-indeed, must-screen passengers for weapons or other items that could threaten aviation security, but documents in its own files make clear that its behavior detection program does not further that mission. Congress should discontinue funding the TSA's behavior detection program, and the TSA should implement a rigorous anti-discrimination training program for its workforce. Details: New York: ACLU, 2017. 30p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed May 14, 2018 at: https://www.aclu.org/sites/default/files/field_document/dem17-tsa_detection_report-v02.pdf Year: 2017 Country: United States URL: https://www.aclu.org/sites/default/files/field_document/dem17-tsa_detection_report-v02.pdf Shelf Number: 150182 Keywords: Airline PassengersAirport SecurityHomeland SecurityPassenger ScreeningRacial Profiling |